

The Police in Delhi in 1857

“The handful of Europeans occupy four times the space of the city which contains tens of thousands of Hindus and Musalmans. The sole mark of the rule of the former which exists in the latter, is apparently a large native house, from the top of which floats a flag, and in front of which is a group of natives in blue cotton tunics, with red piping and tulwars by their sides. They are the police and the house is the Kotwalee or residence and office of the native mayor or Kotwal.”

W. H. Russell, *My Diary in India*.¹

This paper examines the role of the Police in the administration set up by the rebels in Delhi in 1857. The soldiers arrived in Delhi on May 11 and the British re-conquered the city in mid-September. During those four months an estimated hundred thousand professional soldiers and other volunteers thronged the city. Where did these soldiers stay, how was their food arranged, who provided for their upkeep and their needs? In addition to staying there, they were also fighting a daily, incessant battle against the English forces stationed on the ridge. How were arrangements for the battle being made, who supplied the army with rations, provisions, war materials, tents, flaps, sulphur and gunpowder?

The story of the siege of Delhi has either been told in very general terms of tactics and strategy or in apocalyptic terms of victory and defeat. The nuts and bolts of the everyday organization of war have rarely been examined. This paper hopes to fill that lacuna by arguing that the organization of war as well as the maintenance of a general administrative order was in the main the work of the Police force of Delhi. Working mainly on the orders of the commissariat headed by Mirza Mughal, the Commander in Chief for the entire duration of the war except for one day in between, as well as on the instructions of the Court of Mutineers, the consultative constitutional body set up by the soldiers mid-way through the siege, the Police formed the bulwark of the administrative order of the city. The paper also argues that considering the circumstances in hand, the

administrative order of the rebels was surprisingly efficient and effective. Orders were implemented, the paper work required for conveying and effecting orders was thorough and copious and the paraphernalia required for sustaining this massive correspondence, the writers, the paper and the carriers or runners, remained in place right till the very end. I argue that it is only by studying the situation on the ground that we can actually study what the uprising meant in terms of organization and management of people. Very often, as seen in these documents, the uprising meant being able to arrange for a few carts or coolies or tents or grain as the case may have been. Conscription of labor, expropriation of goods and its distribution to the theatre of war, these were the three principal axes of the 1857 uprising in Delhi.

When the city fell to the rebels, after an initial period of confusion and pandemonium which lasted a couple of weeks some order began to be restored to the city. Documents from the early period of the uprising represent attempts by the Royal government to assert its authority. In an attempt to take control, the King wrote to the officers, or *thanadars*, of all the *thanas* or police stations in the city, in the second week of the uprising. It was in the same period that Moinuddin Hasan Khan was appointed Kotwal, or city police chief, for a brief period, replacing Qazi Faizullah.² Shortly afterwards Syed Mubarak Shah was appointed Kotwal and he continued in this post till the end. The remarkable thing however was, once the confusion had settled down, the ease with which the old administrative machinery began to service the rebels' cause. The daily reports of the *thanas* show that almost all *thanadars* and their subordinates remained in place, and in fact there were new recruitments, and by the end of May some degree of order had clearly been fully established as was noted by the Dehli Urdu Akhbar when it praised the new Kotwal for bringing things under control.³ It was the same with other administrative mechanisms. The Magistracy and its secretariat were taken over by Mirza Mughal and although some of the old functionaries abstained from work,⁴ there was enough staff to allow the courts to function as before and the Commander in Chief brought in his own men. Henceforward the court was rechristened after his name but its mode of functioning and its methods of dispensing justice were modeled on the English system. The Court of Mutineers too functioned parallel with and sometimes in tandem with this court.

From the very beginning the soldiers, as well as ordinary people, began to look to the government established by the royal court to provide for them. While the soldiers had reached Delhi on their own initiative, it was as if they were fighting not their own war but someone else'. This is evident from scores of petitions and complaints by soldiers expecting the Court and its functionaries to look after them. They evidently saw the Police as a representative of the royal establishment or of the government that had been established because they could go to the Police and demand rations, provisions and shelter. The ordinary citizens too recognized the police as the representative of the new government that had come into being because they complained to the police about the soldiers' excesses and expected to find redressal. Inter alia, it is noticeable that the relations between the CiC and the soldiers was not as hostile as is made out because the documents contain any number of commands, edicts and orders to regiments which, it appears, were executed promptly. But in the symbiotic relationship between the government and the soldiers and the ordinary people, it is the police which acted as the major interface and the intermediary.

The Police was petitioned when people's houses were plundered by soldiers, when women ran away or children went missing, when shops and grains were required for soldiers' camps, when affrays occurred between citizens, when the administration had to implement orders and commandeer resources. Police duties could range from notifying all people living in dilapidated houses to vacate their places before the big gun was supposed to go off,⁵ to arranging for a charpoy and fuel for the purpose of cremating the dead body of a Subedar,⁶ to figuring out the details for anyone standing bail as to whether they had the property they claimed,⁷ to paying the expenses for and arranging the funeral of indigent women,⁸ to getting the refuse cleared from the city,⁹ to making sure that dead bodies were allowed through by the guards at the city gates,¹⁰ to issuing general proclamations and informing the citizenry of the orders of the commissariat and the court¹¹ and issuing notice of a general levy,¹² to awarding and maintaining contracts to different contractors for shops.¹³ Its indispensability to the administrative set up of the rebels' makes a study of the police establishment an exploration into the nature of the

rebellion. It emerges that the administration kept itself going by the force it could exert on the subalterns. Both, the subalterns who serviced this rebellion in the form of skilled and unskilled labor, as well as the subalterns within the police force, the *barqandazes* who did the major leg work. On occasion when the subalterns revolted, as cases listed below show, it produced a crisis of authority. If the subalterns begin to rebel, then what will happen to the wider rebellion itself?

It remains unclear how and why the police continued to fulfill its duties when other systems, the revenue machinery and the postal system, to take analogous examples, completely broke down. As far as can be made out the Police in Delhi, prior to the uprising, was under the control of the magistracy, why it moulded itself to service the rebel cause is something that still needs investigation. Perhaps it was the prestige of the court and the fact that the Kotwal in the older dispensation functioned directly under the King which played a role in this easy switching of loyalties. On several occasions the King corresponded directly with the policemen and on the occasion of the festival of Baqrid all the *Thanadars* appeared before him and paid him *nuzzurs* but beyond the call of the duty the motivation that impelled them to exert themselves in such an evidently arduous manner remains ambiguous.

The records on which this paper relies are a set of papers stored in the National Archives in India called the Mutiny Papers. The Mutiny papers are a particular set of documents that were extricated and extracted from various sources in Delhi by the occupying English army – from the kotwali, the secretariat, homes, spies, each one diligently marked and copied, sometimes in triplicate, stored as a monument for posterity, one of the great founding moments of the colonial archive. There are thousands of these, indexed in a published catalogue called the ‘Mutiny Papers’. Most of them are in *Shikastah* Urdu, some in Persian and a handful in English translations. Most of these documents have never ever been seen by anyone. The papers were brought together for the trial of the Bahadur Shah, the last King of Delhi. However, for all the colonial intentionality motivating this extensive, meticulous and arduous classification, these

papers provide one of the densest descriptions of a city at war and at work, of administration and anarchy, of deceit and desperation.

Talmiz Khaldun, writing for the collection on 1857 brought out by P.C. Joshi¹⁴ first looked at these papers as a clue to the administrative order of the city. Khaldun, however, concentrated exclusively upon the Court of Administration formed by the mutineers, and even there he looked rather more at the legalistic norms set by the court than at actual practice. Khaldun claimed that the Court of Administration was ‘the highest judicial authority and regulated the judicial procedures for civil and criminal matters and appointed police officers and civil servants.’¹⁵ The documents however stipulate, as will be obvious later, that the bulk of the correspondence of the police officers was with the Commander in Chief Mirza Mughal, and most criminal matters too went to his court. Iqbal Husain’s study of the rebel administration¹⁶ takes a top down view and follows the well trodden line of castigating the princes and finding a general run of disorder and administrative chaos right through. In fact the Princes, at least two of them Mirza Khizr Sultan and Mirza Zaheeruddin alias Mirza Mughal the Commander in Chief (henceforward CiC) manifest themselves in a very good light in these documents. The soldiers, on occasion could even be arrested on the orders of the CiC.¹⁷ Following conventional wisdom Husain makes much of the arrival of Bakht Khan but the documents do not substantiate such primacy for him. However, whether it was Bakht Khan or the CiC or the Court of Mutineers issuing the orders, its implementation was the handiwork of the police.

There certainly was a lot of chaos, there is no doubt that prices were rising, goods and vegetables were scarce and the people were sandwiched between the army, the native war effort and the English. But this was an intense theatre of war. In those circumstances if an order could be successfully implemented it was a marvel and the fact that dozens of such orders were implemented everyday is far more remarkable of notice than the fact that there was general disorder and chaos. Moreover the immense outpourings of petition from ordinary people as well as the soldiery also indicates a certain amount of faith in the ability of the administration to deliver. Plus, the fact that people chose to express their

grievances in the conventional mode, via a formalized petition, also indicates a continuity of the practice of governmentality.

The main police station of the city, headed by an officer called the Kotwal was the Kotwali. Under the Kotwal there were twelve police stations or *thanas*, each of which was headed by a *Thanadar*, also called a Darogha. Other than these, Jamadars and Mohurrirs, or clerks were the other members of the Officer class. Following them were the *barqandaz*, semi-armed, the ordinary policemen who did most of the leg work. We do not have the exact figures for the number of policemen employed in Delhi. But the daily diary of the Kotwali shows that on 27 July there were in all 42 people employed there. There was a Kotwal and two deputy Kowals, 8 mohurrirs or clerks, 1 Jamadar and 25 *barqandazes*, the equivalent of ordinary constables of a later date. Of the 42 people employed at the Kotwali, ten were Hindus, thirty were Muslims while the religion of two cannot be determined. We don't know exactly how many of these had been employed from before the mutiny but the numbers had certainly increased since the uprising.¹⁸ This is evident from the daily diary of the Dariba *thana* of 24th May which lists, apart from the *Thanadar*, one Jamadar, two mohurrirs and 8 *barqandazes* as the old employees of the *thana* and 9 new employees, most of them *barqandazes*.¹⁹ During the uprising, the *thanadar* was paid 4 Rs a month, the old *Barqandazes* were getting 2 Rs and the new ones fifty paise each.²⁰ Extrapolating from that, taking 20 men for each *Thana*, and considering that there were 12 *thanas* in the city, one can arrive at a rough figure of 400 for the total police strength in the city. In addition to the regular policemen every *thanadar* also had some sweepers, drum-beaters and chowkidars, the last paid by local dues, who functioned under him.

Provisions

The Police establishment was the mainstay of the rebel administration that came into being in Delhi after May 11th. Police was in the forefront not merely of policing duties, detecting and preventing crime, but it became, as in any war effort, the main force for collecting supplies, provisions and labor that was essential to waging a war. Money

contributions were raised through the police, it was the force which arrested, detained, browbeat and ferried bankers and merchants. Supply of provisions to different regiments was also the responsibility of the police. So the Police force had to make sure that enough shops were plying and running wherever the regiments were stationed.

In addition to supplying the regiments with food and with delicacies like Puri-Kachauri and Sheerini as the occasion demanded²¹, they had to also provide resources for the war effort. This included not just materials of war, sulphur for gunpowder, but also the manpower required to fight the war. Coolies, laborers, bakers, water-carriers, farriers, masons, anything and anyone that was required was asked of the police. A very large section of the mutiny papers consists of documents to and fro different *thanadars*. At a frantic pace, handling upwards of sometimes hundred documents a day, the *thanas* provided for or managed hundreds of things or peoples. A list of objects and persons they were providing makes for staggering reading: oxen, cobblers, coolies, water-carriers, cattle, rations, doolie-bearers, conveyances, grocers, gunny bags, daggers, spades, axes, flour, ghee, baskets, pulses, sulphur, saddle makers, molasses, wood, husk sellers, carpenters, shoe-smiths, ekkas, mares, carts, sweepers, butchers, blacksmiths, corn, curds, flour, milk, sugar and doctors, and this is only a selection.

The *Thanadar* of Turkman gate sent in a distiller to the Kotwal on 22 June, 3 water carriers, 6 coolies and 2 carpenters on 21st June, and 4 tailors on 18th June, to take further random examples from that particular *thana*, sent doolie bearers, carpenters and milk on 3rd July while stating, for the last date, that due to the non-payment of wages doolie-bearers, coolies, laborers and water-carriers are difficult to find and when found they confront the *barqandazes*. He requested that “they be paid their wages and told not to stand up to *Barqandazes*”.²² The *thanadar* of Turkman Gate, again, saying that 2 grain shops have been provided for near the Nasirabad camp and a *barqandaz* each has been posted there.²³ Money was a constant problem as was the issue of getting the subalterns to work. The potters of the city wrote a petition to the CiC complaining about the *thanadar* of the Turkman gate, saying he compels us to do the work of the coolies, many of our men have run away, if we are conscripted for the work of coolies who will make

pots and pans for the army.”²⁴ Apparently, this petition had no effect for they sent in another one on 21 August repeating their grievances and adding that they are sent to the trenches and they don’t know what to do there and they have no work there.²⁵

Even as the police conscripted and requisitioned labor, it could, on occasion also speak up for them as the Kotwal did by raising the question of wages of 40 doolie bearers who had been sent to the platoon of the 48th regiment.²⁶ As did the *thanadar* of Turkman gate, who wrote to say, in the second week of the rebellion, that 23 cobblers were being sent in but the situation is that the diggers who used to reside in this area have all left town and these cobblers too, “have emerged from their houses with great difficulty and if they are not paid their wages, they would also leave the city in a day or two.”²⁷ On 29 August, the deputy Kotwal wrote in to say that coolies had been sent to the Teliwara trenches from the Kotwali and they have not been paid their daily wages for two days therefore he requests that their wages be paid, “because if wages are not paid to coolies how will they do the work of government...as it is scores of coolies have run away from the city.”²⁸ Whatever it supplied, however, the police expected the price to be paid. As the Kotwal said while supplying fifty sacks and 3 maunds of rope, which have been “bought from the market and sent to his Lordship. We hope their price would be repaid as quickly as possible by the government.”²⁹

The Kotwal, however, came unstuck when asked to supply animals of carriage, “it is known to your Lordship,” he wrote to the CiC, “too that it is difficult to provide for animals of carriage in such numbers and on such a short notice. For *it is possible for the obedient one to arrange to supply those things, through the Thanadars, which are available in the city but things which are not to be found in the city are highly difficult to procure.*”³⁰ Compliance, thus, depended on feasibility and an explanation resting on that ground was, it appears, acceptable. The Police could only deliver what was in the realm of the possible.

Instead of the demand being routed through the commissariat or the court, soldiers could directly go to the concerned *Thana* and ask for supplies, as Imam Bakhsh, a rider of the

Nimach brigade did by reporting to the Kotwali on 27th July. The Kotwal sent in a requisition to the different *thanas* to supply him with various kinds of grains and the order was complied with.³¹ Soldiers could also write directly to the police in case of other requirements as the Subedar of the 30th regiment did when he wrote to the Kotwal demanding 6 thatchers which were needed at the hospital for making fences and, as the bureaucratic norm demanded, the Kotwal responded by inscribing on the margins that a note had been sent to the *thanadar* of Turkman gate demanding thatchers.³²

Apart from trying, ineffectually, to protect the citizens from the excesses of the soldiers the police faced fundamental problems even in making arrangements for their supplies. Grain merchants posted to serve the encampments at Delhi gate protested to the Kotwali that the men of the platoon rarely pay up for the wares they buy and they show cruelty to the shopkeepers. In this case the King inscribed on the margins an instruction for the secretary of the commissariat to deduct the dues from their salaries.³³ Similar was the case of the shopkeepers billeted at the lunatic asylum who complained that soldiers forcibly take their goods and beat them up in the bargain, and if things continue in the same way they would go on a strike.³⁴ The relations between the soldiers and the citizens were always fraught with tension and the police had to constantly negotiate its way through this logjam of dire necessity, lack of money and the refusal of the soldiers to abide by the compulsions of the administration.

There is more below on the interaction between the soldiers and the police but this dependence on police for provision could sometimes take dangerous forms. The Kotwal wrote in one urgent missive to the CiC that on going through the daily diary of the *thana* Chandni Chowk he had learnt that one Ramzan Khan, the Hawaldar of the regiment arrived from Gwalior had issued an open threat. Ramzan Khan came to the *thana* and said that they had hitherto been subsisting on their own, somehow, but now they have been hungry for three days and if they do not get anything to eat they are going to plunder the mohalla of Teliwara and he is giving advance notice of that. This was on 4 September and the administration was faced with a real poverty of options so the King could do little

more than write that they should be admonished and told that they would get their salaries soon.³⁵

Bankers

Dealing with bankers and raising money presented a double bind for the police. On the one hand they were constantly commanded to arrest, detain and house arrest recalcitrant bankers and merchants who refused to make contributions, on the other they were constantly restrained by orders urging them to avoid offending the public.

The *thanadar* of Chandni Chowk wrote to the Kotwal reporting on the bankers of the famous and rich Katra Neel where, “some people disappear inside their houses and do not give any response while most of them make one excuse or another to keep this servant at bay and are forever on the lookout for creating trouble or making complaints.” Accordingly he was sending some bankers hoping that, “a strong rebuke will be administered to them for unless that happens the money will not come forth.”³⁶ On 17th August Nazar Ali again wrote about the refractory nature of the bankers of Katra Neel complaining that they do not come out of their houses or simply vanish and that as their houses could not be searched without permission he was unable to do much in the matter.³⁷

The Kotwali records are replete with efforts to summon the leading bankers and traders of each area. Writing sometime in August the Kotwal circulated a list of names to all *Thanas* saying that these bankers should be brought to the Kotwali and if any resist then a contingent needs to be sent to arrest them. The following merchants were called in from Chandni Chowk, another day- Kanhaiyya Lal Saligram, Thakur Das Chunnimal, Jagannath Bansi Lal, Nanak Chand. Merchants were also called in from Dharampura, Maliwara and Dareeba Kalan, the first two areas lying outside the city proper.³⁸ In an undated communiqué the CiC wrote to the Kotwal to ask him to raise contributions from the respectable Muslims of the city.³⁹ Sometimes it could work in reverse, the police could forward petitions from the people requesting to be exempted from making money

contributions as the deputy Kotwal indicated to the CiC in the case of the poor people of Faiz Bazar area.⁴⁰

But excessive zeal could earn ensure. The same file contains an admonition from the Kotwal to the *thanadar* of Kashmiri Darwaza, scolding him for raiding the shop of Bahauddin without permission from the Kotwali. He is instructed specifically that nobody is to be raided without permission from the Kotwali, “when and if you intend to raid somebody’s house you should immediately inform the Kotwali. Until permission is granted by the Kotwali no raids should be conducted.”⁴¹ In a similar vein an order was sent to the Kotwal on 18 August by the Commander in Chief advising him to refrain from collecting money as the matter has now been taken over by the court. “Except for the members of the court nobody is authorized to arrest any banker and if you receive an order to this effect you should immediately inform the court.”⁴²

Regulating Morals

The Police was called upon to, and sometimes its personnel volunteered to, act as the moral guardian of the people at a time when all consensus about right and wrong had broken down. Sometimes the duties given to them required an impossible degree of resourcefulness, at the same time as putting enormous powers into the hands of the police. The Kotwal was asked, in one communiqué from the CiC, to make sure that no one buys or sells plundered or looted articles to any one. And if anyone is caught doing so they were to be strongly punished.⁴³ Whether the police acted any more urgently on this order than simply issuing a proclamation is not clear but it did create an enormous room for suspicion and for potentially oppressive action by the police. A similar occasion was when Bakht Khan went to the Kotwali and asked the authorities there to issue a general proclamation and send notice to all the *thanadars* that anybody found flying kites, discharging fireworks, raising a weapon or flying pigeons was liable for punishment.⁴⁴ The need for regulating personal conduct was potentially limitless but the coercive structure needed to ensure compliance with these orders would never have been possible without the presence of soldiers on a mass scale.

Sometimes the police, already overburdened, could display zeal for taking on more work. On 24th July, one and a half months in to the uprising it stuck the Kotwal that “clandestine gambling continues again in the areas commanded by *Thanadars* posted in the city.” He therefore wrote directly to the King to say that, “since there are no standing orders on the matter therefore I humbly inquire whether we should end it by arresting all the gamblers.” Fortunately, the King showed some restraint and asked the Kotwal to first issue a general proclamation banning gambling before proceeding to arrest people.⁴⁵ Gambling was presumably banned because a later document shows a Prince Mirza Mohammed Hasan, summoning some arrested gamblers to his court.⁴⁶ Then as now gambling came accompanied by other vices. On 3rd August Mir Akbar Ali, a resident of Faiz Bazar lodged a complaint stating that a gambling house exists near his house and that the gamblers use abusive language and stare at the females of his house.⁴⁷ Some gamblers, apprehended by the *thanadar* of Turkman gate resisted their arrests and attacked a couple of *barqandazes*, the zealous *thanadar* reached the spot and had three of them arrested. They were all sent to the Kotwali to be fined.⁴⁸ Gamblers were certainly having a hard time because they could be arrested by ordinary soldiers as well, as the case of the sepoy Tehdil Khan, noted below, makes clear.

The dilemmas and problems faced by the Police in acting at once as the preventive arm as well as the chief executive wing of the government were exemplified on the occasion of Baqrid, when a general order banning cow slaughter was passed in the city. The police was not only urged to make sure that the ban was implemented, they were also persuaded to take up preventive steps to ensure that this did not happen. On 30th July, the Commander in Chief wrote to the Kotwal asking him to issue a general proclamation to make sure that not only does no one commit cow slaughter but to “arrest anyone who so much as even thinks of doing so. It has been heard that some mujahideen (volunteers) intend to perform this act, so go to the Maulvi Saheb and ask him to talk to them... This year nobody should think of doing so otherwise unnecessarily there would be a riot and the enemy’s hands would be strengthened.”⁴⁹ Apart from circulating the order to all the *Thanadars* and issuing a general proclamation everywhere, the Kotwal wrote to all the

Thanadars asking them to send him a list of all the cow-owning Muslims in their respective areas.⁵⁰ The *Thanadars* acted accordingly. The problem occurred when the King issued an order instructing the Kotwal to assemble all the cows owned by the Muslims and keep them in the Kotwali. As the Kotwal explained to the King, there was not sufficient room in the Kotwali to assemble all the cows owned by the Muslims in the city there. In turn he suggested that *thanadars* may be directed to get bonds executed by the Muslims to the effect that they would not sacrifice cows.⁵¹ Accordingly, the *thanadar* of Turkman gate wrote to say that undertakings had been taken from all the cow-owning Muslims of his area.⁵²

But was this enough to make sure that the orders would be implemented and there would be no cow slaughter in the city? In order to further ensure that no slaughter happens surreptitiously the Commander in Chief wrote to the Kotwal to count all the skins of dead animals and the amount of grease available with the butchers, an order that was sent to all the leading butchers as well.⁵³ One can only wonder what this would have meant for the citizenry at large for the police could arrest anybody on any of the following charges, sacrificing cows, owning cows and not giving an undertaking, possessing skins or showing an intention of killing cows. Three weeks earlier there was the case of a kebab-seller who had been arrested on the charge of cow slaughter. Hafiz Abdur Rahman stated in a petition to the King that he had been arrested by some soldiers while selling kebabs, a profession he had been forced to take up “in the present when all jobs of Shahjehanabad are at an end.”⁵⁴ When the King wrote to the Kotwal asking him why Abdur Rahman had been arrested, he replied that they had been reported by Debi Prashad Hawaldar of the 1st Company, appointed at the Lahori Gate, “on the charges of cow-slaughter with the notice that he had taken five hundred Rs from the English to commit cow slaughter in front of our barracks with the intention of creating a riot between Hindus and Muslims.”⁵⁵ Vigilantism, evidently, was not an exclusive preserve of the police.

Tilangas⁵⁶

The biggest stumbling block for the police was the presence of an enormous body of armed soldiers who would demand things off them but not allow them to function without hindrance. Not only would soldiers interfere in their work but would also lean on the police to do their bidding when simple force was not enough. They would arrest people and bring them to the Kotwali or to a particular *thana*, or assault the *thana* and free a particular accused as they saw fit. On 22nd June some *barqandazes* of *thana* Bhojla Pahari were doing their customary rounds near the Lahore Gate when they noticed two sacks. Feeling suspicious they made bold to inquire into it whereupon the soldiers appointed there gathered together and proceeded to give a solid thrashing to the two hapless *barqandazes*.⁵⁷ Similar was the case of the Farrashkhana, the guards appointed to man it were regularly charging bribes. The *thanadar* of Guzar Qasim Jan wrote to the Kotwal saying that when challenged by the *barqandazes* of the *thana* they threatened to beat them up and explicitly told the *Thanadar* to mind his own business who would have let it pass but for the fact that they were now even demanding money to allow documents to pass.⁵⁸

Sometimes soldiers would interfere with the Police when they were busy raising supplies or commandeering labor.⁵⁹ Then there was interference in its investigative agency, well illustrated by the case of the prostitute Waziran. A soldier Ram Prashad brought a charge of theft against her and on inspecting her house the Kotwal recovered the stolen goods. But when he brought her to the Kotwali, just before she recorded her statement, a large group of soldiers landed up there and forcibly took her away. An exasperated Kotwal wrote to the CiC complaining of the soldiers and saying that the said prostitute had been an accused in several cases before and was about to admit her guilt when the Tilangas took her away. “The situation is this,” he wrote, “*that the soldiers interfere in everything...and this prostitute has been brought to the thana in several cases earlier.*”⁶⁰

The plunder of Gopi’s house, resident of Guzar Dariba presented a similar set of dilemmas. The plundered goods were lying in the house of Banne, of Bazar Urdughar, and at the house of Daya Kaur but, wrote the kotwal, “at the houses of these accused soldiers are staying,” and so it was difficult to appoint guards there. If their houses are to

be searched it would be better that they only do it, “since it is the provenance of war [soldiers] therefore the matter is outside the purview of normal criminal affairs.” The soldiers had also forcibly taken away Banne and Daya Kaur after they had been brought to the Kotwali.⁶¹

The case of Jangyaar Khan illustrates further the difficulties the Police had in dealing with the soldiers. In this case Sheikh Gulzar claimed to have recovered some of his stolen goods from the quarters of one Jungyaar Khan. When he woke up one night he found his huqqa missing and when he stepped out to search for it he found his mate beating up a thief. Together they went to his quarters, found other stolen goods and arrested the five men loitering there.⁶² The accused Jungyaar Khan, on the other hand, claimed he was arrested “while he was carrying some flour and the soldiers looted a gun, rifle, a dagger, a sword and some cash which was in my possession, along with a dupatta, a handkerchief and a pagri and accusing me of stealing goods they took me to the *thana*. I am a volunteer, one brother of mine has been killed, I have never been arrested on any charge and now I have been looted.” Another accused Budhoo claimed that he was arrested not from the address pointed out by the soldiers but from atop a shop where he was sitting when the soldiers were passing it. Another rider sitting with him seized his sword and “said to the Tilanagas that this man here is not in the employ of anyone, arrest him too.”⁶³

Sepoys could thus arrest people simply for loitering or for carrying flour, which, in the highly strained nature of supply of provisions was not such an insignificant thing. This posed a problem for the Kotwali authorities. Since the accused had been brought by soldiers they were bound, under the circumstances, to treat the complaint seriously. On the other hand, as the deputy Kotwal said in his report, ‘the case was weak and the evidence weaker.’ But since the case concerned ‘soldiers of war therefore the accused have for the moment been kept in custody and the details of the case are beings sent to the commander in chief for him to take the necessary action.’⁶⁴

The soldiers’ power of detention, however, only acquired legal force once the police had been involved. Jiwan Singh, a sepoy of Sixty First Platoon, Seventh Company, who

arrested Basanti on charges of theft because he had seen a boy entering the latter's house with stolen goods before bringing him to the nearest *Thana*.⁶⁵ After gambling had been banned in the city a sepoy of Bailey Platoon, Fourth Company, Tehdil Khan arrested some people for gambling, but he had to call out to the *barqandaz* of the *thana* before he did so and even then it did not become a bona fide case until he brought the *Thanadar* to the spot and had them arrested.⁶⁶

In a collection from 1st July the CiC wrote to the kotwal asking him to stop forced searches of houses by soldiers by saying, "without the order of the government and the presence of the informer no [forced] searches will be conducted at any respectable person's house."⁶⁷ Accordingly, when the soldiers were hell bent on searching the house of a rich magnate, Ajudhia Parshad, the Kotwal instructed the *thanadar* to "tell the soldiers that they should first go to the General Bahadur with the informant and submit an application there, when an order is passed from there a search will be conducted. Without the application of the spy/informant no searches will be conducted at respectable people's houses."⁶⁸

Discipline

Discipline within the force was at a premium. All *thanadars* were urged to maintain a regular daily diary, a practice of the past, and send it punctually to the Kotwali. The King himself wrote to all the *thanadars* in the second week of assuming command, warning them that they will be punished if they neglect their duties. "It has been heard through the Kotwal that the reports and diaries of different *thanas* do not reach the Kotwali and the *Thanadars* are not present in the *Thana* day and night. Therefore they are being commanded to be present and prompt day and night in administering the city and should present reports of each case to the Kotwal everyday. If they act contrary to this they will be punished."⁶⁹ On 24 July the Commander in Chief wrote to all the *thanadars* and the Kotwal to make sure that all *Thanadars* send in their diaries by eight in the morning.⁷⁰ Every circular, whether from the Kotwal or other *Thanadars* or parwanas, orders from higher ups, were supposed to be copied in hand and a receipt signed on the document

itself. When circulars returned unsigned it indicated absenteeism, something, which even in spite of the turbulence of the times did not go unnoticed. The deputy Kotwal, therefore, complained that there was no officer in the Dariba *thana* to receive petitions except for two illiterate *barqandazes*.⁷¹

There could sometimes be graver problems. In one of the rare documents which allows the *barqandaz*- the subaltern employer of the *Thana* who actually implemented all the orders and did the rounds-to speak, Ghazi Khan of the Turkman Darwaza *thana* refused point blank to carry out an order in the middle of the night saying ‘such urgent orders come everyday, we are not going out just now we will only go in the morning.’ The matter involved the requisitioning of four water carriers, an order for which arrived at the Turkman Gate *thana* at twelve o’clock at night. When the *Barqandazes* were called out Ghazi Khan, leading four others, refused to comply. Only in the morning, after the Jamadar had given them a written order did they go. Whereupon, a panicked Kotwal wrote to the Commander in Chief saying that, “if this happens and the *barqandazes* refuse to obey the officer’s orders then how will government work be done. Even earlier the *Thanadar* had sent in a note complaining about the *barqandazes*. *If every Barqandaz gets the courage to do ghadar*⁷² *and they would then do ghadar whenever an urgent task comes up.* Therefore I submit that Ghazi Khan etc the four *barqandazes* should be dismissed which would prove salutary to the others otherwise they would not obey anyone’s orders.”⁷³

We don’t know whether the *barqandazes* were actually dismissed but it is interesting to note that neither the *Thanadar* nor the Kotwal had the power to dismiss or appoint anyone in his command. Other documents outlining requests from Kotwals or *Thanadars* seeking dismissal of blind or infirm or old *barqandazes*, or even their transfers had to be routed to the Commander in Chief. On 22 June, the Kotwal wrote to all *thanadars*, asking them to report if any posts of *Barqandaz* or Jamadar or Mohurrir was vacant in their respective *thanas*⁷⁴ or “if any *Barqandaz* was inefficient or negligent in carrying out the orders of the government.” Even as small a matter as the room rent that a *barqandaz* could pay had to be cleared by the Commander in Chief. The *thanadar* of Bhojla Pahari,

Mirza Amani Beg wrote to the CiC on 30th July saying that “since the time the royal government took over, the number of *Barqandazes* have increased and there is not enough room for charpoys for all to fit in,” therefore he requested the sanction of two Rs a month for renting a room for them.⁷⁵ The *thanadar* of Guzar Itiqad Khan, Faiz Talab Khan wrote on 27 May stating that the older employees of the *Thana* have not been paid their salaries of two months, let alone the newer ones.⁷⁶ The police was functioning as the strongest arm of the revolution but it was not an arm which was free to move on its own.

The vigilantism showed towards following orders and being on duty seems to have been there from the beginning. This is evident from the case of Faiz Mohammed Khan, resident of Turkman Gate, a merchant artisan who made a complaint that on the night of Id his house was broken into but when he went into the *Thana* to lodge a complaint he couldn't find anyone there.⁷⁷ Upon this the *Thanadar* sent in an indignant reply, refuting the fact that he was not on duty and impugning the motive behind the complaint in the boot. He said he had gone to offer Id prayers while the clerk was in the toilet and when asked to wait this fellow had chosen to go home. He went on to add that Faiz Mohammed Khan had concocted the report of the break in order to take over the goods by stealth and in these situations that the complainant never desires a search or registers claims against anyone. “As far as being absent or present is concerned, the situation is this that this devoted one never absents himself from duty even for a minute and the clerk of this *thana* is an outsider and he never goes anywhere.”⁷⁸ What is remarkable here is the eagerness shown by the *thanadar* to deny the charge of dereliction of duty, whether he was doing this out of fear of censure or out of a lure for reward remains unclear.

But it was not just the top officials who were dissatisfied with the functioning of the Police. Ordinary citizens too had their share of complains. On 24th June, barely a month into the uprising, the residents of Chandni Chowk sent in a petition to the Commander in Chief complaining about the oppression of Hafiz Aminuddin Khan, the *thanadar* of Chandni Chowk, saying that he was a badmash who spent all his time loitering around with bad characters and he has proved so cruel that if he continues “the subjects are sure to be ruined.”⁷⁹ If the *Thanadar* was warned or reprimanded, we do not have the evidence

to be sure of that but he was replaced sometime in July. Before that, however, he himself had problems implementing orders. On 3rd July he wrote to the Kotwal complaining about a certain Punjabi tailor who refuses to obey orders from the *Thana*. The Punjabi tailor he said was a rogue who has abused the *Barqandazes* and “has made many tailors run away and unless he is properly punished he will not obey the orders given out.”⁸⁰

Sometimes one *Thana* could interfere with the work of another. When a *barqandaz* of Chandni Chowk was sent to collect carts in the area of the Allahabad Road he faced an unexpected problem. The Jamadar and Mohurrir of the said *thana* forcibly took it away from him and handed it over to some soldiers. So Nazar Ali, the *thanadar* wrote to the kotwal requesting him to “issue a circular to the *thanadar* of Guzar Allahabad inquiring into why they acted thus.”⁸¹

Interference could come from other quarters too. A *thanadar* wrote in to complain about a ruffian Afzal who assaulted some *barqandazes* while they were trying to conscript labor, and said that “I too rule this place, if you take people away by force we will confront you...if you have arms, we too are armed, you cannot take them away like this.” He freed all the coolies and laborers who had been assembled.⁸²

Not only were the jobs and tasks of the *Thanadar* well minded, their jurisdiction too was closely watched. Although they were being asked to perform all sorts of extra-policing duties, in the performance of them they were not allowed to step beyond their exact imprimatur. On 19 August, when the Kotwal, replying to an order of the Commander in Chief, wrote that the particular case being enquired into had already been compromised, he earned a sharp rebuke from General Tale Yaar Khan, member secretary of the court of mutineers. “That the plaintiff had first made a claim and then you write they have compromised with each other, it is not clear whether the complainant’s case was true or false. Therefore it is being written to you that you should not, for any case, make a decision and send it to our court. Send both parties to our court now.”⁸³

If the jurisdiction of the Kotwals was closely guarded, the police too, on occasion could deny doing a chore by saying it was not a part of their duties as the Kotwal did when he was asked to remove carcasses of dead camels lying on Daryaganj. He clarified, to the King, no less, that it was the duty of Mir Ami Ali and he should be made to do it.⁸⁴

Women

Along with all this, the police had to deal with an inordinate number of cases of women missing. Women were eloping with soldiers, soldiers' wives were deserting them, courtesans and prostitutes were colluding with soldiers and all this at a rate that it ensured that any time during the uprising at least one *thana* in the city was dealing with a disappeared woman everyday. In the circumstances then prevailing in the city, when the population of the city had doubled, it was no mean task to try and locate a particular missing woman. Not surprisingly, there were few instances of reported recovery for any of these women. And even the police functionaries were not immune to this. The missing wife of Gopal *barqandaz* of *thana* Paharganj was spotted with Jiwan Khan and Nawab Khan, Hawaldars of Third Company Sappers and Miners, and they were said to be looking after her. In case of arrest, wrote the Kotwal, it was highly likely that there would be a riot and "*his Lordship is well aware of the situation of the soldiers of war.*"⁸⁵

On 24 July the deputy Kotwal wrote to a *thanadar* about the case of the woman kept by sepoy Hira Singh who had run away with all his belongings and was now staying with Baluchar grenadier arrived from Agra. He instructed the *thanadar* to find the woman and leave the arrest to the sepoy himself. The *thanadar* wrote back to say that the accused sepoy was not staying in his jurisdiction.⁸⁶ There were similar communiqués from the *thanadar* of Bhojla Pahari on 16 August reporting the missing wife and property of Haider Ali, a rider of the Sixth Cavalry Regiment 14 arrived from Datiya Jhansi,⁸⁷ from the *thanadar* of Faiz Bazar regarding the case of the groom of a Risaldar Ghulam Mohiuddin of 18th cavalry running away with Dilpasand Kaur,⁸⁸ from the Kotwal to all *thanadars* regarding the wife of Pir Bakhsh who had run away with his goods and valuables, and scores of others. In the case of these missing women often a physical

description of the woman accompanies the report. Pir Bakhsh's wife was described as being 25 years old, of wheatish complexion, average height, slim body wearing a pajama choli, with close knit eye brows.

There was the extended case of Bilasia, daughter of Basti, formerly married to Suraj Bali, son of Chhote, of Merath. Suraj Bali left her and in fact sold her to a sweeper and she came to Delhi. Her father Basti then came to Delhi and paid off the due of ten Rs, buying her back from the sweeper. He then wrote a letter to Suraj Bali asking him to take Bilasia but he refused. A case was then filed in the court of one Mr Cook at Merath and Bilasia was handed over to Basti. When the uprising took place, for some reason, Suraj Bali decided to reclaim Bilasia. So he came to Delhi, reached the camp of the Merath soldiers and with the help of his caste fellows, vegetable sellers, found her whereabouts and wrote a petition to the Commander in Chief. He then solicited help from some of the Merath soldiers and together they went to the Nigambodh ghat area, located Basti and forcibly took her away. In the process they beat up her father and mother with lashes and a stick and injured Bilasia with a knife on her neck. The whole proceedings were recorded at the Kotwali where it transpired that Bilasia was now pregnant with another man, Bhikhari, with whom she had a seven month pregnancy. Detailed statements of all the principals, including several witnesses were taken at the Kotwali and at the court of the Commander in Chief.⁸⁹ Eventually, all were allowed free on bail, but not before Bilasia produced a dead child in the lock up.⁹⁰

In some cases missing or eloped wives were found but they refuted the versions given out by their spouses. Pir Bakhsh, tinman, complained that the wife of his deceased brother, whom he treated with great consideration, had recently run away with a soldier, Jabar, of the volunteer platoon and when he located her and urged her to return the 100 Rs she had made away with she refused to return and in fact threatened him by saying that "I will get you beaten up by soldiers."⁹¹ An order was then sent to Kalwant Singh, commander of the fourth platoon, Regiment 38 asking him to produce the woman along with the soldier Jabar.⁹² The soldier was duly arrested and the woman was produced in the court. Her version of the events was that Pir Bakhsh assaulted her and threw her out of the house

therefore she had gone away.⁹³ In cases like these it was impossible to detect who was lying and who was giving out the truth. Eventually, it was decided that no charge could be proven against the woman therefore she was allowed to go free but the case was finally decided on 11 September, three days before Delhi fell. Until the moment that the city fell the administrative order remained in place pretty much as it had been.

Then there were cases of disturbances created by prostitutes of different hues. Kunwar Lal, the *thanadar* of Dariba wrote to the Kotwal at the end of June reporting the case of the dispute between a prostitute Sundar and her tenant Abdur Razzaq. Over a dispute about payment of rent, three soldiers then present in her quarters came and fired upon Abdur Razzaq. After the *thanadar* had brought both of them to the *Thana* a further set of soldiers dropped in, this time claiming to speak for Abdur Razzaq, "he is our brother, we will take him and this prostitute to the court of the Commander in chief." The *Thanadar* managed to stay his ground and send the disputed parties to the Kotwali for the case to be decided as the Kotwal saw fit.⁹⁴

Sundar Kasbi (prostitute) managed to make a name for herself. In an undated communication the clerk of the Dariba *Thana* wrote to the Kotwal requesting him to reprimand a bad character called Gopal who frequents her place. His visits can cause an 'untoward incident and that if he continues he will be punished.'⁹⁵

Conclusion

The police did the 'dirty work' for the revolution in Delhi. In ways which have very contemporary echoes the police was called upon to conscript, commandeer and procure, even as it was urged not to offend the public or to alienate the population. What is remarkable is both that it did this work and that it got things done. Yet, the documents do not show any particular partisanship of the Police towards the rebels. If they had sympathy or feeling for the rebel side it is not reflected in the documentary evidence. Hence it is intriguing that when all other government departments collapsed, the police continued to function as well as before, and better in some ways. Perhaps it owed to the

fact that it was a largely Muslim force and sympathized with the royal fate, or perhaps it was because it was a hierarchically organized body and setting in motion a chain of command kept the machinery going. What does come through is the fact that most of them were functioning as salaried bureaucrats and doing their jobs. A much more demanding kind of a job no doubt, but still it was a job for most of them. The official nature of the correspondence, conducted and composed by professional scribes in all cases, never betrays any emotional attachments. It is order and impersonality everywhere.

This effectiveness of the Police is all the more remarkable given the fact that its coercive authority was undermined by the presence of such a large body of armed soldiery. Further, given the way the police was acting and given the presence of such a mass of soldiery one would expect the citizens to be coerced into silence. But the presence of such a huge body of complaints by the citizenry shows that rather than abandoning faith in the administration the people were rather looking to it to for salvation. This was true for complaints against the police itself. The people could speak out against injustices and expect the government to respond to them. Police could not always bend everyone to its will; intransigence was encountered not merely among the subalterns it was pressing into service but also by other citizens, the Punjabi tailor who quarreled with *barqandazes* or Afzal the ruffian who freed conscripted laborers or the citizens of Chandni Chowk who complained against their bullying *thanadar*.

By and large, the force held its discipline. There are plenty of documents stating the inability of a particular *thanadar* to fulfill the task required of him for reasons of unavailability but there is not a single document where a *thandar* could be said to have displayed insubordination of any kind. There may have been other instances of a *barqandaz* refusing work but instances of outright rejection are rare for the subordinates and officers alike. Considering that the *thanadar* could neither appoint nor dismiss a *barqandaz* of his free will, the lack of instances of insubordination by them becomes far more remarkable of notice.

The noticeable thing therefore was the degree of order that could still be maintained. The bureaucratic norms that had been established for the mode of receiving grievances as well as for the way in which they were addressed remained in force. As the inordinate amount of paper work indicates orders and commands issued by the commissariat could reach a particular *thana* within the day itself. The *Thanadars*, with the help of their clerical staff, could produce or reply to dozens of missives everyday and obviously carriers were in place to allow this correspondence to happen. Every order sent by the Commander in Chief to the Kotwal or to the thanadars was to be copied in hand and recorded in the register of the *thana* or the Kotwali. It is amazing that *Thanadars* who have conscripted coolies, to take one instance, to send them to the Commander in Chief should insist on getting a receipt for it and should insist that they be paid. Receipts for all goods and persons sent at all times, that is the motto for each *Thanadar*. The receipts do not necessarily add up to any particular reward for any of them, in fact some of them remain unpaid themselves, but they are an indication of the relatively healthy nature of the administrative order that had taken charge of the city. Not only were documents zealously produced they were also supposed to be sealed and covered properly. Syed Nazar Ali, the *thanadar* of Chandni Chowk wrote an apologetic note to the Commander in Chief on 14 August stating that the documents in future will be sealed properly and that the incorrect sealing which has been pointed out was done not by he himself but by the Mohurrir of the *thana* Durga Prashad.⁹⁶

The reason the Police became so indispensable to the administration and to the war effort in Delhi was because it was the only organized body available to the government. It helped that it was a coercive body too and was semi-armed. This was the first time that the ancient regime was called upon to perform tasks and functions that befit more a modern government. In order to successfully wage the war effort the administrative order in Delhi perforce needed a mechanism to implement and act on its orders, which were, oftentimes, coercive in nature. At the same time the administration was relying quite intensively on public morale and support. At all times therefore the police had to walk a tightrope between getting the job done and not stepping on too many toes. Apart from the soldiers, the higher ups were not in favor of granting the police too many summary

powers. The Police therefore had to tax the public without offending it. An impossible task at all times but made even more difficult by the lack of money.

The soldiers do come off badly in these documents but everybody comes off badly in police records. Most of them were ill-fed and ill-cared for. Most of them were fighting bravely too. Delhi was peculiar compared to other centers of the uprising in so far as that it did not have a hinterland to feed off. There was no body of *Taluqdars* sending in supplies and men to service the cause. The citizens of the city were ticked off not just by the soldiers but also by the editor of the Dehli Urdu Akhbar who found their lack of fervor quite alarming.⁹⁷ The picture that emerges here of the soldiers has to be offset against other documents in the Mutiny Papers where preparations and practice of war gain more attention. They were after all fighting a voluntary war, without resources.

It was the events of 1857 that lent urgency to the cause of Police Reform which was enacted in 1861. The organization of that force was heavily colored by the experiences of the uprising and the force which emerged was perforce a semi-military one. Discussions about police reform from the 1830s centred fundamentally around the autonomy of power enjoyed by the Darogha, on the manner in which he could influence the outcome of the case by his powers of detention and by the case report that he prepared.⁹⁸ Interestingly, this was something the authorities of the rebel administration tried to keep in check by a constant inspection of the police diaries. The other essential question facing police reform was the question of separation of judicial and revenue duties. But the main issue was the unauthorized judicial power exercised by the police darogha and the lack of supervision over the clerk who recorded statements⁹⁹, and as we saw in the case of Delhi, even during the uprising the police was ticked off for making decisions on their own even though statements were usually recorded in the court run by the CiC. When the reforms were finally acted enacted the code writers were ‘careful to provide a complete system of supervision by European Officers, the want of which...has been one of the greatest disadvantages of the Civil Police system heretofore existing in India.’¹⁰⁰

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All selections of Mutiny Papers from the National Archives of India.

¹ W. H. Russell, *My Diary in India* (London, 1859).

² Charles Metcalfe, *Two Native Narratives*, The Narrative of Mainodin Hasan Khan, p . 50.

³ *Dehli Urdu Akhbar*, 31 May, 1857.

⁴ Notably Munshi Jiwan Lal, see the Narrative of Munshi Jiwan Lal, *Two Native Narratives*, cited above.

⁵ Collection 111a, Number 148, 22 June 1857.

⁶ Collection 111c, Number 127, 7 August 1857.

⁷ Collection 111c Number 159, 10 August 1857, see also 111c-160,

⁸ Collection 124 Number 115, 20 June 1857.

⁹ Collection 128 Number 64, 16 June 1857.

¹⁰ Collection 128 Number 34, 10 June 1857.

¹¹ Collection 57 Number 543 undated

¹² Collection 120 Number 129, undated.

¹³ Collection 45 July 26- September 3, 1857.

¹⁴ P. C. Joshi, *Rebellion-1857* (Delhi 1957 and 1986). Paper by Talmiz Khaldun, "The Great Rebellion," p1-72.

¹⁵ *Ibid*, p 40.

¹⁶ "The Rebel Administration of Delhi," *Social Scientist*, 296-99, 1998. P. 25-39

¹⁷ See for e.g. Collection 103 Number 218, 30 July 1857.

¹⁸ Collection 103 Number 213, 25 July 1857.

¹⁹ Collection 104 Number 2 and 3, May 24 1857.

²⁰ Collection 123, Number 6 27 May 1857.

²¹ Collection 103 Number 220, 1 August 1857.

²² Collection 61, Numbers 84, 82, 66 and 111.

²³ Collection 61 Number 86, 22 June 1857.

²⁴ Collection 67 Number 152, undated

²⁵ Collection 67 Number 111, 21 August 1857

²⁶ Collection 45 July 26- September 3, 1857.

²⁷ Collection 61 Number 1, 23 May 1857.

²⁸ Collection 129 Number 80, 29 August 1857.

²⁹ Collection 111c Number 34 28 July 1857

³⁰ Emphasis added. Collection 45 July 26-September 3, 1857

³¹ Collection 103 Number 215 27 July.

³² Collection 111c Number 49, 29 July 1857.

³³ Collection 125 Number 12, 11 June 1857.

³⁴ Collection 124 Number 306, 23rd August 1857.

³⁵ Collection 103 Number 362, 4 September 1857.

³⁶ Collection 61, No 547, undated.

³⁷ Collection 61, Number 396, 17 August 1857.

³⁸ Collection 53 May 19-August 10, 1857.

³⁹ Collection 63 Number 98, undated.

⁴⁰ Collection 63 Number 46, 16 August 1857.

⁴¹ Collection 53 May 19-August 10, 1857.

⁴² Collection 129, Number 61 18 August 1857.

⁴³ Collection 101 Number 26, 13 August 1857.

⁴⁴ Collection 120 Number 190, 31 August 1857.

⁴⁵ Collection 111c Number 11, July 24 1857.

⁴⁶ Collection 111c Number 222 August 18 1857.

⁴⁷ Collection 62 Number 80, 3 August 1857.

⁴⁸ Collection 45 July 26-September 3 1857.

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- ⁴⁹ Collection 111c Number 64, 30 July 1857.
- ⁵⁰ Collection 45, July 26- Sep 3, 1857.
- ⁵¹ Collection 111c, Number 44, 29 July 1857.
- ⁵² Collection 61, Number 265, 30 July, 1857
- ⁵³ Collection 111c Number 45, 29 July 1857.
- ⁵⁴ Collection 103, Number 132 10 July 1857.
- ⁵⁵ Collection 103, Number 134, 11 July 1857.
- ⁵⁶ A common word for soldiers employed by the East India Company, probably originating in Telengana where they were first recruited, particularly popular in Delhi and in these documents where it stands in for sepoys.
- ⁵⁷ Collection 103, Number 24, 22 June 1857.
- ⁵⁸ Collection 110, Number 293, undated.
- ⁵⁹ Collection 45 July 26-Sep 3, 1857.
- ⁶⁰ Emphasis added. Collection 45 July 26-Sep 3, 1857.
- ⁶¹ Collection 45 July 26-Sep3 1857
- ⁶² Collection45, July26-Sep3, 1857. Copies of Reports from the Kotwali.
- ⁶³ Ibid.
- ⁶⁴ Collection 45, July 26-Sep3, 1857.
- ⁶⁵ Collection 71 Number 165, 15 August 1857.
- ⁶⁶ Collection 103 Number 412, undated.
- ⁶⁷ Collection 60 Number 253, July 1 1857.
- ⁶⁸ Collection 60 Number 253, July 1, 1857.
- ⁶⁹ Collection 120, Number 1, 20 May, 1857.
- ⁷⁰ Collection 120 Number 134, 24 July 1857.
- ⁷¹ Copies of Reports from the Kotwali, Collection 45, July 26-Sep3, 1857.
- ⁷² This is one of the few contemporary references I have found to this word which has come to stand for the uprising itself. Here it definitely means disobedience and rebellion.
- ⁷³ Emphasis added. Copies of Reports from the Kotwali, Collection 45, July 26-Sep3, 1857.
- ⁷⁴ Collection 120, Number 16, 22 June 1857.
- ⁷⁵ Collection 122, Number 22, 30 July 1857.
- ⁷⁶ Collection 123, Number 6, 27th May 1857.
- ⁷⁷ Collection 61, Number 3, 25 May 1857.
- ⁷⁸ Collection 61, Number 4, 25 May 1857.
- ⁷⁹ Collection 61, No 95, 24 June 1857.
- ⁸⁰ Collection 61, No 117, 3 July 1857.
- ⁸¹ Collection 61 Number 256 29 July 1857.
- ⁸² Collection 124 Number 327, undated.
- ⁸³ Collection 103-303 19 August 1857
- ⁸⁴ Collection 111b, Number 14, 3 July 1857.
- ⁸⁵ Emphasis added. Collection 45 July 26-Sep 3, 1857.
- ⁸⁶ Collection 123 Number 143, 24 July 1857.
- ⁸⁷ Collection 121 Number 105, 16 August 1857
- ⁸⁸ Collection 120 Number 137, 25 July 1857.
- ⁸⁹ Collection 60 Numbers 349-359, 20-21 July 1857.
- ⁹⁰ Collection 60 Number 361 22 July 1857.
- ⁹¹ Collection 60 Number 686, 7 September 1857.
- ⁹² Collection 75 Number 22, 7 September 1857.
- ⁹³ Collection 60 Number 688, 11 September 1857
- ⁹⁴ Collection 106 Number 31, 30 June 1857.
- ⁹⁵ Collection 104, Number 67, undated.
- ⁹⁶ Collection 61, Number 367, 14 August 1857.
- ⁹⁷ *Dehli Urdu Akhbar*, 14th June, 1857.
- ⁹⁸ Ibid, p 305.
- ⁹⁹ Radhika SIngha, *A Despotism of Law-Crime and Justice in Colonial India* (Delhi, 2000.) p. 304.

¹⁰⁰ From the Police Commission to the Secretary of to the Government of India, Home Department, Calcutta, September 1860, p 3, clause 14.